

amended petition, asserting two grounds for relief. First, petitioner alleged that the State had violated the plea agreement by calling the DOC officer to testify in support of a twenty-five-year maximum. Second, petitioner claimed that the sentence was unfairly based on prior convictions not disclosed in the PSI.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the court issued a written decision in June 2005, granting the State's motion and denying petitioner's. The court ruled that DOC was not a party to the plea agreement; that the PSI was designed to provide an independent recommendation for the court separate from the plea agreement; and that the PSI's recommendation and the officer's testimony did not therefore violate the agreement. The court also noted that petitioner had been put on notice at the change-of-plea hearing that the PSI might contain a recommendation different from the sentence which the State's attorney had agreed to recommend. As to the omissions in the PSI, the court noted that petitioner did not argue he lacked notice of the prior convictions. There was no claim that the criminal records check provided petitioner during the discovery process was incomplete, or that defendant was somehow unaware of his own criminal history. Accordingly, the court concluded that the omissions in the PSI were not prejudicial. The court entered an order dismissing the petition. This appeal followed.

In State v. Black, 151 Vt. 253 (1988), the defendant raised a claim similar to petitioner's, arguing that his plea agreement with the State was violated when a probation officer testified at sentencing in favor of a sentence longer than that which the State's attorney had agreed to recommend. We declined to address the issue, however, concluding that any violation was cured when defendant was offered an opportunity by the sentencing court to withdraw his plea. Id. at 254-55. Here, similarly, the record obviates any need to address the issue. It is axiomatic that a post-conviction relief petitioner must show both error and prejudice arising from that error, @ In re Carter, 2004 VT 21, & 35, 176 Vt. 322, and it is readily apparent here that petitioner suffered no prejudice from the alleged violation. Despite DOC's recommendation of a longer maximum sentence, the court in fact sentenced defendant to a maximum term of twenty years, consistent with the plea agreement. Therefore, the DOC recommendation was essentially harmless. To avoid this conclusion, petitioner argues that DOC's recommendation might have influenced the court to reject petitioner's request for a maximum of five years, but the record belies the assertion. In imposing sentence, the court explained that the twenty-year maximum was based on defendant's criminal record, the circumstances of the current offenses (which involved a knife and put children at risk), and the safety of the community. The court made no mention of DOC's recommended maximum, although it did explain at length why it was adopting DOC's recommended minimum. Accordingly, we conclude that any error was harmless.

Petitioner also renews his claim that the sentence was unfair because it was based, in part, on petitioner's prior criminal convictions, a number of which were omitted from the PSI. The claim is unpersuasive. Petitioner does not claim that the information adduced at the hearing about his criminal record was inaccurate, but rather that, without a list of the prior convictions, he was denied the opportunity to offer explanations or mitigating factors. The record shows, however, that the State included petitioner's criminal record as part of its discovery disclosures prior to the change-of-plea and sentencing hearings. Petitioner does not claim that these records were incomplete, that he lacked notice of his prior criminal record of eighteen misdemeanors and sixteen felonies, or that he was unaware of the State's intent to rely on that record at the sentencing hearing. See State v. Pellerin, 164 Vt. 376, 382 (1995) (rejecting claim that defendant was denied fair sentencing by lack of notice of prior victim's testimony where criminal records were disclosed prior to sentencing and defendant was aware of State's intent to rely on defendant's past offenses). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's finding that petitioner had sufficient notice and opportunity to respond to the State's evidence, and that the omission was therefore harmless. See State v. Senna, 154 Vt. 343, 347 (1990) (holding that failure to provide document to defense counsel prior to sentencing hearing was harmless where counsel was otherwise on notice of its contents).

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice