


for the children had stagnated, if not indeed deteriorated, since they entered DCF custody; she had failed to meet the case plan goals; had engaged in “violent, unpredictable and anti-social behavior” including domestic assaults, violent confrontations with the police, and involvement in a burglary; allowed strange men to enter the home; failed to obtain necessary psychiatric care; and maintained a violence-prone domestic-partnership relationship. The court further concluded that mother’s “chaotic” life “seriously threatened” the children’s wellbeing and put them “at risk of emotional trauma.” The court thus determined that termination of mother’s parental rights was “required in order to enable [C.H. and M.H.] to have an opportunity for a safe, loving, and permanent home” and that there was “no chance” that mother could resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable time. The court also noted that the children had been residing with their foster family for nearly a year and a half, and were thriving. Accordingly, the court granted the State’s petition to terminate parental rights without limitation as to adoption. This appeal followed.*

Mother challenges none of the underlying findings on appeal, but rather contends that the court’s conclusion that she could not resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable time lacks crucial findings concerning “the needs of the children.” Mother notes that the reasonable-time element “must be measured in terms of the child’s needs,” *In re B.M.*, 165 Vt. 331, 337 (1996), and asserts that without findings concerning “the children’s current situation, their needs, or a general time during which they should achieve permanency,” the court’s ultimate conclusion is unsupported.


Although the court did not expressly state that it was measuring a reasonable time “in terms of the children’s needs,” its findings and conclusions summarized above leave no doubt that its assessment was based precisely on their critical need—at the tender ages of five and six—for permanence, safety, and stability. This is implicit in the court’s findings that mother’s behavior threatened the children’s welfare, and that termination was essential to afford them a “safe, loving, and permanent home.” These findings, among others, are more than sufficient to show that the court considered the issue from the perspective of the children’s needs. See *In re E.B.*, 158 Vt. 8, 14 (1992) (court need not pronounce “magic words” from statute where its meaning is otherwise apparent); *In re C.L. & H.L.*, 151 Vt. 480, 482-3 (1989) (we will uphold judgment in absence of explicit findings when record shows that the court considered requisite factors in terminating parental rights). Accordingly, we find no error.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:



Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice



John A. Dooley, Associate Justice



Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

* The court also terminated the parental rights of father, who was divorced from mother in 2006 and, as the court found, has had no relationship with the children. He has not appealed from the order terminating his parental rights.