



prevailing party and disregarding modifying evidence.”). For example, sellers suggest that buyers must have known of the contamination before hearing about it from sellers’ attorney shortly before the scheduled closing date, but they neither challenge the court’s findings to the contrary nor cite the record in support of the suggestion. This is true of several other statements made by sellers. Nor do sellers make any coherent arguments amounting to claims of error. See Schnabel v. Nordic Toyota, Inc., 168 Vt. 354, 362 (1998) (stating that Court will not address assertions unaccompanied by facts, law, or reasoning). For example, other than their claim that buyers must have known of the contamination, sellers fail to challenge any of the elements of negligent misrepresentation found by the court. Moreover, although sellers note that buyers failed to obtain inspections that were their responsibility under the purchase and sales agreement, they do not otherwise challenge the superior court’s ruling that, notwithstanding any such provisions for inspections in the agreement, sellers had an obligation to disclose to buyers the history of contamination on neighboring properties.

To a large extent, sellers appear to blame their former attorneys, other parties’ attorneys, and their real estate agent for their troubles, but because they did not appeal from the superior court’s partial final judgment in favor of their real estate agent, they are precluded from challenging that judgment here. See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, *Federal Practice & Procedure* § 2661, at 154 (1998) (“[O]nce there has been a Rule 54(b) certification and a final judgment has been entered, the time for appeal begins to run.”). They also claim apparent bias on the part of the trial court, but fail to demonstrate any bias whatsoever. See Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 163 Vt. 83, 96 (1994) (stating that judicial bias cannot be demonstrated based on adverse rulings alone); Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161 Vt. 35, 45 (1993) (stating that “bias or prejudice must be clearly established by the record,” and “that contrary rulings alone, no matter how numerous or erroneous, do not suffice to show prejudice or bias”); State v. Carter, 154 Vt. 646, 647 (1990) (mem.) (stating that party seeking to disqualify judge “must affirmatively and clearly show bias or prejudice directed against him,” and that disqualification may not be based on “innuendo” or “unsubstantiated suspicion”). In short, they fail to make any argument that raises any doubts concerning the superior court’s decision. Although we give some leeway to pro se litigants and will address, if possible, arguments that may not comply with Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 but are nonetheless comprehensible, in this case it is difficult to decipher any legitimate claims of error. As we have stated numerous times, in the absence of any coherent claims of error, we will not peruse the record searching for error. See Jordan v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2004 VT 27, ¶ 10, 176 Vt. 465 (stating that reviewing court “will not search the record for error”).

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

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John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

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Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

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Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice