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= &n= bsp; &nbs= p; = &n= bsp; ENTRY ORDER
= &n= bsp; &nbs= p; SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-169
= &n= bsp; &nbs= p; = &n= bsp; MAY TERM, 2005
State of Vermont = &n= bsp; &nbs= p; = <= /span>} = APPEALED FROM:
v. = &n= bsp; &nbs= p; = &n= bsp; } = District Court of Vermont,
} Unit No. = 2, Chittenden Circuit
James Villa  = ; &= nbsp; &nb= sp;  = ; &= nbsp; }
} DOCKET NO= . 1282/1283-3-96 CnCr
Trial Judge: James Crucitti
= ; &= nbsp; &nb= sp; In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Defendant appeals from an order revoking his probation and imposing the underlying sentences on convictions for sexual assault on a minor and lewd and lasciv= ious conduct with a child. Defend= ant argues that the grounds for revocation were not proven. We affirm.
In 1996, defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual assault on his minor daughter C.V. and two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> The district court sentenced him = to serve seven to twelve years on the sexual assault conviction, and consecut= ive terms of one to five years on the two counts of lewd and lascivious behavior. The court suspende= d the sentences and placed defendant on probation. Defendant’s probation condi= tions prohibited him from having any contact with minor females or having contact with C.V. absent permission from her therapist and defendant’s proba= tion officer. The conditions also required defendant to undergo sex offender counseling as recommended by his probation officer.
In November 2003, defendant’s probation officer filed a complaint alleg= ing that defendant had violated his probation conditions. The complaint alleged that defend= ant had contact with a minor female when he took a ride in a car with his son and = baby granddaughter in March 2002. The complaint stated that in April 2003, defendant had contact with C.V. witho= ut permission from either her therapist or his probation officer. In October 2003, defendant again = drove in a car with C.V., and while driving, they picked up a man defendant knew= from his sex offender treatment group. On that occasion, C.V.’s infant daughter was in the car. The probation violation complaint also explained that defendant has a history, dating back to 1975, of sexual offenses against minors. Defendant has six known child vic= tims, the complaint explained, and he is at a high risk to reoffend. The probation officer recommended= that the court revoke his probation and impose the underlying sentences.
The court convened a hearing on the complaint in February 2004. Defendant admitted to the violati= ons relating to his contact with C.V., but he contended that the violations we= re de minimis and did not warrant revocation of his probation. The court scheduled a contested h= earing on sentencing, which took place the next month. After hearing from defendant and = his supporting witnesses, the court revoked defendant’s probation and or= dered him to serve the underlying sentences.&nb= sp; Defendant filed this appeal.
appeal, defendant argues that the court failed to make the findings necess=
to support probation revocation, and in any event, the record does not sup=
the court’s sanction for the de minimis violations at issue here.
(1) Confinement is necessary to protect the community from further criminal activity by the probationer; or
(2) The probationer is in need of correctional treatment which can most effect= ively be provided if he is confined; or
(3) It would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation w= ere not revoked.
28 V.S.A. § 303(b). The co= urt is not required to “specifically identify which of the alternatives set forth in § 303(b) it has employed so long as at least one readily sup= ports the court’s conclusion.” State v. Millard, 149 Vt. 384, 387 (1988).
Here, the court found that the probation restrictions were clearly set out in the probation order and contract with the State. In addition, defendant’s pr= obation officer made those conditions clear to him on a number of occasions. Defendant testified that he under= stood the conditions and agreed that he violated them anyway. The conditions, the court found, = were designed to protect defendant’s victims, including his own daughter.= They were imposed to prevent defe= ndant from reoffending and creating a new set of victims. The court’s findings leave = no doubt that it considered defendant was at risk of reoffending and that confinement was necessary to protect the community. 28 V.S.A. § 303(b)(1).<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>
Defendant argues that in the absence of evidence that he reoffended or that “h= e was associating with minor females in high-risk situations,” the court c= ould not conclude that confinement was necessary to protect the community. Defendant contends that he is rehabilitated. He testified = at the sentencing hearing that he simply became lackadaisical towards the probati= on conditions because he was nearing the end of one of his sentences.
The court did not find that defendant was rehabilitated notwithstanding defendant’s belief otherwise. The fact that defendant violated the clear terms of his probation by engaging in conduct that did not involve another sexual assault or offense against a child is fortunate. But that type of criminal conduct is not a prerequisite to finding that confin= ement is necessary to protect the public against the possibility that defendant = might reoffend. Given defendant= 217;s criminal history and his knowing and repeated violations of the terms of h= is probation, the court explained that it would be irresponsible to, essentia= lly, wag a finger at defendant and let him continue on probation. The court’s decision to rev= oke defendant’s probation is supported by the record.
BY THE COURT:
Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice