STATE OF VERMONT PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM

In Re: Melvin Fink PRB File No. 012-2019

> DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL'S REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO LIFT STAY

In response to Respondent Fink's February 21st Opposition and in further support of its

February 2nd Motion to Lift Stay, Petitioner Office of Disciplinary Counsel, pursuant to A.O. 9,

Rule 20(B) and V.R.C.P. 7(b)(4), offers the following Reply Memorandum and appended

Exhibit 10.

**REPLY MEMORANDUM** 

Respondent Fink's cursory Opposition offers little reasoning and no applicable authority

for denying Disciplinary Counsel's motion to lift the nearly five-year stay of proceedings in this

disciplinary proceeding. Indeed, Respondent's Opposition is most notable for what it fails to

state or controvert.

First, Attorney Fink does not dispute that, since the March 2019 imposition of the stay in

this matter, the Supreme Court has indicated that attorney disciplinary proceedings should not

normally be delayed or deferred pending resolution of related criminal prosecutions,

notwithstanding the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination in a criminal case.

See In re Legus, 2020 VT 49, ¶¶ 9-10. Second, Attorney Fink does not deny that, given his self-

incriminating testimonial admissions in *State v. Fink* as part of the diversion "Resolution

Agreement," he has already waived or greatly undermined his right against self-incrimination,

thereby vitiating any justification for a continued stay of these disciplinary proceedings.

Respondent Fink's apparent acquiescence to these conclusions provides two independently

sufficient reasons to grant Disciplinary Counsel's Motion to Lift Stay.

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Attorney Fink does suggest that the stay will expire automatically in three months based on its own terminating condition of "entry of judgment in the trial court in the related criminal proceeding," *State v. Fink. See* Mar. 28, 2019 Ruling on Request to Stay at 6. He represents that "[h]e is expected to fulfill his obligations to the [Diversion] program in less than 90 days. If he completes the contract, the criminal case will be dismissed and a judgment entered." Opp. at 1-2 (emphasis added). In predicting, with no citation to authority, that the Bennington Superior Court will enter a judgment of dismissal, pursuant to V.R.Cr. P. 32(b), upon his successful completion of his Diversion program, Attorney Fink is apparently ill-informed and mistaken.

The Vermont Judiciary's own official forms indicate that upon a criminal defendant's successful completion of a Diversion program, the State prosecutor will voluntarily dismiss the charges, pursuant to V.R.Cr. P. 48(a), rather than the Court entering any kind of judgment of dismissal. *See* Vermont Judiciary Form 375, "Notice of Right to have Records Sealed," copy attached hereto as **Exhibit 10** (noting that "You have successfully completed your participation in the . . . Diversion Program. Your case will be dismissed by the State's Attorney . . . . . "); *see also* www.rutlandrestorativejustice.org/programs ("If a participant successfully completes all tasks outlined in the [Diversion] contract, the charge will be dismissed by the state."). Once the State files this notice of dismissal, "the prosecution shall thereupon terminate," V.R.Cr. P. 48(a), such that there is no longer any extant criminal case over which the Court would have jurisdiction to even enter judgment.

Likewise, the adult Diversion statute, 3 V.S.A. § 164, does not contemplate or even mention entry of any judgment after successful completion of Diversion. During the November 7, 2023 "diversion colloquy" hearing in *State v. Fink*, none of the attorneys, nor the Court itself referred, even in passing, to any judgment. For all these reasons apparently, Judge McDonald-

Cady stated that it was her expectation, after Respondent Fink has "successfully completed" Diversion, "to just have the case closed altogether," rather than to enter a judgment. *See* Nov. 7, 2023 Hearing Tr. at 45:12-15, *State v. Fink*, **Ex. 3**.

Accordingly, when Attorney Fink successfully completes his Diversion program, as is expected by all, *State v. Fink* will terminate without entry of judgment, thereby leaving in place an indefinite stay of this attorney discipline proceeding. Such an absurd and unintended result clearly warrants the Hearing Panel's reconsideration and lifting of its March 2019 stay order.

Next, Respondent asserts that "[m]aintaining the current stay for a short period will allow for the completion of the diversion contract or the resumption of the criminal prosecution." Opp. at 2. However, Attorney Fink never explains why or how an immediate lifting of the stay in this matter would impede Diversion or the State's prosecution. Rather, a continued stay of this matter is in no way necessary to "allow" for the resolution of *State v. Fink*. On the contrary, the Supreme Court indicated its expectation in *Legus* that factually-related criminal prosecutions and attorney disciplinary matters can (and often should) proceed simultaneously.

Finally, Respondent Fink rather cryptically insists that "[1]ifting the stay would necessitate resolution of the issues the stay was imposed to avoid." *Id.* To the extent that Attorney Fink alludes to the perceived self-incrimination dilemmas sometimes imposed on lawyers faced with parallel criminal and disciplinary matters, the *Legus* Court suggested that there was no constitutionally impermissible dilemma because an attorney, during the course of a disciplinary proceeding, may simply invoke the right against criminal self-incrimination in response to specific questions posed by Disciplinary Counsel. *See Legus*, 2020 VT 49, ¶ 10. However, as impliedly conceded by Respondent's Opposition, any such self-incrimination dilemma has already been resolved by the self-incriminating admissions of Attorney Fink in the November 2023 *State v. Fink* 

Diversion hearing.

In sum, Attorney Fink offers no cogent rationale or legal basis for maintaining the stay of this attorney disciplinary proceeding now that his criminal liability for sexually assaulting J.H. has, unexpectedly, been resolved through non-adjudicatory Diversion, rather than by a judgment of conviction or acquittal.

#### **CONCLUSION**

WHEREFORE, Petitioner Office of Disciplinary Counsel respectfully requests that the Hearing Panel (1) immediately lift the stay of proceedings in this matter; and (2) order the parties to promptly submit a stipulated proposed Scheduling Order for this matter.

Dated at Burlington, Vermont this 6th day of March 2024.

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL

/s/ Jon T. Alexander

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## DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL'S REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO LIFT STAY

# **EXHIBIT 10**

### **Notice of Right to Have Records Sealed**

	You have been convicted in Vermont Superior Court, Criminal Division of the commission of a crime and you were under 18 years of age at the time of the offense of the crime;			
			OR	
	You have successfully completed your participation in theCounty Court Diversion Program. Your case will be dismissed by the State's Attorney			
	by			
	You have the rig	ght to ap	ply to have your criminal records se	ealed two years after:
		rge from	nviction a correctional supervision was dismissed after successful comple	etion of Diversion
If yo	our records are se same as not havi	aled, no	one would be able to see them or ki	now that they exist. It would be
	ase note: If you a ords sealed, your i		icted of a crime between now and that hay be denied.	ne time you apply to have your
to ha	ave your records	sealed (s	bottom of this page. Keep it in a safe see the box checked above), fill out to f this page. If you lose this form, sen an additional copy at the Court Clerk	he form and send it to the court
			cannot afford an attorney, you should	
			Petition to Have Records Sealed (Please print or type)	d
DEDICE :	COLUDE		STATE OF VERMONT	
PERIOR (	ERIOR COURTUnit			CRIMINAL DIVISION Docket No.
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Notice to Defendant: Please retain a copy for your records.

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### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on March 6, 2024, Respondent Melvin Fink, Esq. was served with

Disciplinary Counsel's Reply in further support of his Motion to Lift Stay and supporting Exhibit

10 in the above-referenced matter by email only to the following counsel of record:

David C. Sleigh, Esq. Sleigh Law, PC 364 Railroad Street, Suite E PO Box 278 St. Johnsbury, VT 05819 david.sleigh@sleighlaw.com

in accordance with A.O. 9, Rule 18(B) and Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 5.

Dated at Burlington, Vermont this 6th day of March 2024.

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL

/s/ Jon T. Alexander

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