

might help her to safely parent her new child, it found that the program takes about nine months to complete, and was “too little too late” for G.W., who required permanency now. The court further found that G.W. had developed a close and healthy bond with his foster parents, the child’s paternal grandparents, and was thriving in their home. The court thus concluded that mother could not resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable period of time, and granted the petition. This appeal by mother followed.*

Mother’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that she could not resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable period of time because the court erroneously “dismissed the likelihood that adoption by the grandparents would end up being an interim measure leading to . . . father being allowed by the grandparents to assume custody of G.W.” The claim is predicated largely on the court’s finding that the grandmother “hopes that . . . father can have a constructive role in [G.W.’s] life on his release from jail, but has made no specific commitment to . . . father along those lines.”

The argument is unpersuasive. As we have frequently observed, a finding of parental unfitness is not affected by the possibility of a future adoptive home or other placement. In re T.T., 2005 VT 30, ¶ 7, 178 Vt. 496 (mem.). Thus, whatever the likelihood of G.W.’s adoption by his grandparents and their future decisions concerning contact with father, mother’s fitness to parent G.W. was a separate matter. In this regard, mother has challenged none of the court’s findings and conclusions specifically concerning her ability to resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable time, which are fully supported by the record.

It is not necessary that an adoptive home be identified in order to terminate parental rights. The important goal of permanency for a child achieved by freeing them for adoption does not guarantee permanent stability for the child. Potential adoptive placements, if any, identified at the time of a TPR hearing may not ultimately work out for a multitude of reasons. Post-adoptive changes in lives of the adoptive parents, such as death or separation, may also affect the child’s long-term stability. But these considerations do not have any impact on whether parental rights should be terminated.

Furthermore, the record does not support mother’s claim that adoption would be an “interim” disposition leading to father’s resumption of custody. The record shows, and the court found, that the grandmother hoped that father would remain significantly involved in G.W.’s life. She did not state or imply, however, that she would allow father to resume custody if his rights were terminated. Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the judgment.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

Beth Robinson, Associate Justice

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

* Father has not appealed from the judgment.

